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AGAINST THE CURRENT: FIVE STATES’ UPSTREAM
BATTLE AGAINST AN AQUATIC NUISANCE INVASION IN
MICHIGAN V. UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The Great Lakes are an interconnected system of five large
bodies of freshwater that are of remarkable significance in North
America.1  In the United States, state and federal authorities began
constructing artificial channels and canals during the early twenti-
eth century to manipulate the lake system in the interest of com-
mercial navigation.2  A series of such channels and canals, known as
the Chicago Waterway System (CAWS), connects Lake Michigan
with the Mississippi River Basin.3  While the CAWS has undoubtedly
played a key role in the development and commercial advancement
of the Chicago region and the surrounding Midwest, it has become
an enabling factor for a pressing environmental problem concern-
ing the vitality of the Great Lakes.4
The Great Lakes are in grave danger of a destructive, aquatic
nuisance species establishing a breeding population in its water sys-
tem.5  The problem began in the 1970s when “aquatic farmers in
the southern United States introduced bighead and silver Asian
carp to their facilities in the hope that the fish would control un-
wanted plant growth.”6  Flooding in the region where the carp were
introduced enabled the fish to enter nearby freshwater systems, and
the rapacious species eventually traveled through the Mississippi
River Basin to an area within six miles of Lake Michigan.7
1. See Physical Features of Great Lakes, ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
geo.msu.edu/extra/geogmich/phy_feature.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (dis-
cussing physical features and importance of Great Lakes).
2. Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 893 (7th
Cir. 2014) (Asian Carp II) (discussing construction of CAWS).
3. Id. (discussing features of CAWS).
4. Id. (explaining CAWS’s positive impact on commercial development in
Midwest alongside current problems associated with it).
5. Id. (noting two species of nonnative fish have already overwhelmed Missis-
sippi River basin and threaten Great Lakes’ ecosystem).
6. Id. (discussing introduction of Asian carp to region).
7. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 894-95 (explaining introduction of carp to North
America); see also Asian Carp Species, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA),
available at http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/12-38002.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2014) (detailing history of Asian carp in North America, their rapacious,
invasive qualities, and severe, adverse impact they have on ecosystems).
(289)
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Asian carp devastate the ecosystems of the lakes and rivers they
invade.8  The carp pillage native species’ food supply, multiply
quickly, and congest whichever body of water they penetrate.9  For
example, a “fish kill” conducted in the Mississippi River near St.
Louis in 1999 revealed “Asian carp constituted over 95% of the bio-
mass . . . at that place and time.”10  Asian carp weigh an average of
thirty to forty pounds; however, they are capable of reaching 100
pounds and “can eat between 20% and 120% of their own body
weight daily.”11  Additionally, the carp are dangerous to humans
and negatively affect recreational activity in the waters they
invade.12
In 2014, in Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Engineers13
(Asian Carp II), five states bordering the Great Lakes sought a per-
manent injunction ordering the construction of a physical barrier
that would completely separate Lake Michigan from the Mississippi
River Basin, the only conclusively effective means available to pre-
vent Asian carp from establishing a breeding population in the
water system.14  After discussing the likelihood of the carp’s migra-
tion into the Great Lakes and the ensuing irreparable harm to their
ecosystems, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff States failed to assert a claim warranting
equitable relief.15  Consequently, the court denied the injunction
8. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 896 (noting Asian carp’s negative impact on na-
tive species they encounter); see also Asian Carp Overview, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/miss/naturescience/ascarpover.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2014) (explaining why Asian carp are problematic).
9. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 896 (“The carp are rapacious eaters of plankton,
algae, and other small organisms . . . they have crowded out other fish.”). See also
Asian Carp Overview, supra note 8 (discussing serious damage to other fish popula-
tions caused by Asian Carp).
10. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 896 (noting “fish kill” results for illustration of
threat). See generally Michael J. Hansen, The Asian Carp Threat to the Great Lakes,
GREAT LAKES FISHERY COMMISSION (Feb. 9, 2010), available at http://www.glfc.org/
fishmgmt/Hansen_testimony_aisancarp.pdf (explaining Asian carp’s threat to
Great Lakes).
11. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 896 (noting carp’s physical dimensions and rapa-
cious nature).
12. Id. (discussing Asian carp’s impact on recreation).  “[W]hen agitated (for
example, by motorboats), the carp leap out of the water, threatening damage to
recreational and commercial watercraft and injury to passengers on board.” Id.; see
generally NorthAmericanFishing, “Silent Invaders” Asian Carp 2013, YOUTUBE (Apr.
16, 2013) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPeg1tbBt0A (exemplifying carp’s
behavior in presence of motorboats and recreational activity).
13. 758 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2014).
14. Id. at 897 (discussing States’ request for equitable relief).
15. Id. at 907 (holding plaintiff States failed to state claim under public nui-
sance theory).
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request.16  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the defendant agen-
cies already attempting to prevent the carp’s invasion were better
suited than the court to determine the proper remedial method
necessary to avert the impending problem.17
This Note investigates the court’s reasoning in Asian Carp II
and its potential impact on future cases regarding time-sensitive en-
vironmental concerns.18  Part II summarizes the facts in Asian Carp
II.19  Next, Part III examines the Second Restatement of Torts’ role
in public nuisance cases, details the legal framework surrounding
environmental public nuisance theory, and explores the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning in a preliminary injunction case leading up to
Asian Carp II.20  Then, Part IV outlines the Seventh Circuit’s reason-
ing in Asian Carp II.21  Subsequently, Part V assesses the court’s in-
consistent rationale in Asian Carp II and subjects the case’s main
issue to a comprehensive public nuisance analysis set forth in the
Restatement.22  Lastly, Part VI considers the decision’s potential im-
pact on pressing environmental problems in the future.23
II. FACTS: NOT YOUR AVERAGE FISH TALE
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the
Metropolitan Water Reclamation District (District) are the govern-
mental entities responsible for the maintenance and operation of
the CAWS.24  For more than a decade, the Corps and District have
taken preventative measures to combat the carp’s invasion.25  Nota-
bly, the Corps implemented underwater electrical cables with the
16. Id. (holding plaintiff States failed to present evidence warranting perma-
nent injunction).
17. Id. at 905-06 (expressing reluctance to interfere with defendants’ ongoing
preemptive efforts).
18. For a critical analysis of Asian Carp II, see infra notes 173-244 and accom-
panying text.  For a discussion of the decisions potential impacts, see infra notes
245-68 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the facts of Asian Carp II, see infra notes 24-51 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the public nuisance doctrine with previous decisions
interpreting them in an environmental context, see infra notes 52-144 and accom-
panying text.
21. For a narrative analysis of the court’s reasoning in Asian Carp II, see infra
notes 145-72 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of Asian Carp II, see infra notes 173-244 and accom-
panying text.
23. For an examination of the potential impacts of Asian Carp II, see infra
notes 245-68 and accompanying text.
24. Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 894 (7th
Cir. 2014) (noting Corps and District are responsible for operation of CAWS).
25. Id. at 896 (noting Corps and District’s preemptive efforts).
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intent to kill, shock, or stun fish attempting to pass into Lake Michi-
gan.26  The Corps put three electrical barricades, officially known as
“Dispersal Barrier Systems,” into operation in 2002, 2009, and
2011.27  Despite these efforts, concurrent evidence revealed the
carp’s infiltration beyond the electrically fortified zones.28  For ex-
ample, in 2009, Asian carp were spotted beyond an electrical bar-
rier in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal.29  Further, “[i]n
November of that year, ‘environmental carp DNA (eDNA), which is
found by collecting water samples and testing them for the pres-
ence of genetic material emitted by the carp, was detected north
(lakeward) of the barrier system.”30  In response to tangible evi-
dence of the carp’s presence near Lake Michigan, the Corps ap-
plied a fish poison called rotenone near the barrier on several
occasions.31
In 2012, Congress passed the Moving Ahead for Progress in the
21st Century Act32 (Progress Act), which ordered the Corps to con-
sider hydrological separation as a possible solution to the Asian
26. Id. (discussing Corps’ electric barrier system).  The Corps conceded the
electrical barriers are merely “experimental and [a] temporary fix.” U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENG’RS, DISPERSAL BARRIER EFFICACY STUDY at 34 (Jan. 6, 2010), available
at  http://www.watershedcouncil.org/learn/aquatic%20invasive%20species/asian-
carp/asian-carp-studies-and-reports/files/image%2012%20interim_i_final.pdf.
27. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 896 (detailing implementation of “Dispersal Bar-
rier Systems”); see also Electric Barriers, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://www.lrc.
usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorksProjects/ANSPortal/Barrier.aspx (last visited
Oct. 5, 2014) (giving overview and current status of Dispersal Barrier Systems).
28. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 896 (noting evidence of Asian carp presence
beyond electric barriers).
29. Id. (noting evidence of Asian carp’s breach of electric barrier).
30. Id. (discussing eDNA testing).
31. Id. (discussing Corps’ response to presence of Asian carp beyond electric
barrier).  After the Corps’ first application of rotenone, a dead carp was removed
from the vicinity. Id.  The Corps applied rotenone for a second time in May 2010
in another area of the CAWS, but it failed to yield any dead carp. Id.  “The follow-
ing month, however, a single bighead carp was recovered in Lake Calumet, well
lakeward of the barrier and only six miles from Lake Michigan.” Id.  Conversely,
the Asian Carp Regional Coordinating Committee monitored the CAWS from Sep-
tember 2010 through April 2014, but their tests failed to find any indication of
Asian carp lakeward of the barriers. Id.  “[T]he Coordinating Committee’s tests
. . . involve (among other things) a mix of electrofishing and contracting with
commercial fishing crews.” Id. See also U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGR’S, Summary of the
GLMRIS Report: Great Lakes and Mississippi River Interbasin Study, http://glmris.anl.
gov/documents/docs/glmrisreport/GLMRISSummaryReport.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2014); see also Sampling Results, ASIAN CARP RESPONSE IN THE MIDWEST, http://
www.asiancarp.us/sampling/results.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2014).
32. Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
126 Stat. 405 (2012) (noting Progress Act set February 6, 2014 as deadline for
Report).
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carp problem.33  The Corps completed the required document—
the Great Lakes and Mississippi River Interbasin Study Report (Re-
port)—and released it on January 6, 2014.34  In the Report, the
Corps presented “eight alternative plans for preventing the spread
of aquatic nuisance species between the Mississippi River Basin and
the Great Lakes Basin.”35  The Report asserts six of the proposed
plans would stop the spread of Asian carp within twenty-five years,
which, interestingly, is when the Corps expects the aquatic nuisance
species will invade Lake Michigan.36  Two of the Report’s suggested
plans utilize “nonstructural” means (i.e. chemical control and net-
ting) that would merely maintain the current situation and would
have no impact on the spread of the carp.37  Another two of the
proposed plans assessed complete hydrological separation of the
Mississippi River from Lake Michigan; however, the Corps pre-
dicted complete separation would negatively affect the navigability,
water quality, and ecosystems in the surrounding bodies of water.38
In 2014, five states bordering the Great Lakes—Michigan, Wis-
consin, Minnesota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania (States)—sued the
Corps and District based on their belief that Asian carp pose an
imminent threat of invasion into the Great Lakes.39  Also, a Native
33. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 898 (noting purpose of Progress Act).  The Pro-
gress Act required the Corps to complete a report that was previously assigned by a
2007 statute. Id. See also Water Resources Development Act, Pub. L. No. 110-114,
121 Stat. 1041 (2007).  Moreover, the Progress Act authorized the Corps to pro-
ceed to preliminary stages of development if the Secretary of the Army determined
that hydrological separation is the most suitable means of addressing the Asian
carp problem surrounding the CAWS. Id.
34. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 898 (noting Corps’ completion of Report).  In-
terestingly, the date the Corps released the Report was two weeks before the Sev-
enth Circuit heard oral arguments in Asian Carp II. Id. See generally Summary of the
GLMRIS Report, supra note 31, for a summary of the Report.
35. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 898 (explaining what Report entails).
36. Id. (expressing Corps’ predictions based on proposed plans).
37. Id. at 899 (explaining nonstructural options would merely maintain status
quo and were projected to have no impact on spread of carp).
38. Id. (discussing Corps’ assessment of hydrological separation options).
One of these plans intends to utilize lakefront barriers, while the other proposes
barriers in the CAWS and the Cal-Sag Channel. Id.  The Corps’ Report noted that
the hydrological separation plans would be the most expensive. Id.  Two more of
the plans involve partial hydrological separation, which would completely discon-
nect Lake Michigan from the Mississippi River at most intersections, but would
leave at least one of the five CAWS pathways unblocked. Id.  The final two pro-
posed plans do not involve hydrological separation, but, rather, create a “buffer
zone” between the Mississippi River and Lake Michigan, which would give the
Corps time to respond to imminent threats of invasion when they arise. Id.  More-
over, the Corps’ final propositions depend on the construction of additional locks,
barriers, and sluice gates to form the necessary “buffer zone.” Id.
39. Id. at 894 (explaining States believe Asian carp will invade or already have
invaded Great Lakes).
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American tribe, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa
Indians (hereinafter included in “States”), intervened as a plain-
tiff.40  In Asian Carp II, the plaintiff States contended that the Corps
and District, in their capacity as the governmental entities responsi-
ble for the CAWS’s operation, failed to protect the Great Lakes.41
Consequently, the States asserted that the Asian carp’s invasion
stood to inflict billions of dollars of damage on the Great Lakes and
their ecosystems.42
The plaintiff States sought “a permanent injunction requiring
the Corps and District to take all appropriate and necessary mea-
sures expeditiously to develop and implement plans to effect a hy-
drological separation between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi
River Basin.”43  Further, the States claimed that the Corps’ and Dis-
trict’s manner of operating the CAWS made it possible for Asian
carp to migrate towards Lake Michigan.44  The States thereby al-
leged that joint failure of the Corps and District endangered a pub-
lic right—the right to enjoy and benefit from the Great Lakes—
thus, creating a public nuisance.45
The Corps and District pointed to several statutes, which, they
asserted, “add up to a congressional mandate to keep the waterway
open no matter the cost.”46  Moreover, the Corps and District al-
leged they were “fully authorized” to operate the CAWS in order to
facilitate navigation between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi
River.47  The Seventh Circuit relied on the information gathered in
the Corps’ Report as well as evidence of the Corps and District’s
efforts to prevent the aquatic nuisance intrusion.48  Additionally,
the court assessed the States’ request for hydrological separation
alongside the study compiled in the Report and decided it was an
40. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 895 (noting Indian tribe intervening as
plaintiff).
41. Id. at 894 (explaining States’ belief that Corps and District failed to pro-
tect Great Lakes).
42. Id. (discussing alleged monetary detriment caused by Corps and District’s
failure to protect Great Lakes).
43. Id. at 897 (detailing States’ request for equitable relief).  Hydrological sep-
aration entails the construction of a physical barrier that would prevent any water
transfer between the currently connected systems. Id.
44. Id. at 903 (clarifying that States’ nuisance claim parallels Corps and Dis-
trict’s manner of operation of CAWS).
45. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 903-04 (explaining States’ public nuisance claim
rationale).
46. Id. at 902 (discussing Corps and District’s argument).
47. Id. at 902-03 (addressing “fully authorized exception”).
48. Id. at 902-06 (assessing Corps and District’s preventative efforts).
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impractical measure under current circumstances.49  In sum, the
Seventh Circuit held that the States’ complaint failed to “plausibly
allege that the Corps and District are creating a current or immi-
nent public nuisance by their manner of operating the CAWS[,]”50
and, therefore, “the States . . . failed to state a claim under which
relief can be granted, either under a public nuisance theory or
under the APA.”51
III. BACKGROUND: ANGLING THE PUBLIC NUISANCE DOCTRINE
A. Public Nuisance Doctrine’s Role in the Second Restatement
In Asian Carp II, the Seventh Circuit noted that courts deciding
public nuisance claims under federal common law typically refer to
the Second Restatement of Torts for guidance.52  The Restatement
defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public.”53  The Restatement also sug-
gests conduct is a public nuisance when it significantly interferes
with the public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.54
Additionally, if actors know, or reasonably should know, their con-
duct permanently or continuously affects a public right, the actor is
usually liable under public nuisance doctrine.55
Further, the Restatement affirms that courts hearing a public
nuisance complaint generally assess a negligent defendant’s unin-
49. Id. at 904-05 (discussing what injunction requiring hydrological separa-
tion would entail).
50. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905 (holding States’ complaint does not show
Corps and District’s operations caused alleged imminent public nuisance).
51. Id. at 897, 907 (treating States’ claims under public nuisance doctrine and
APA as one single claim).  “The complaint raised claims under both the federal
common law of public nuisance and the judicial review provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 . . . we noted that those claims were
functionally the same.” Id. at 897.
52. Id. at 894 (referring to Restatement’s definition as “common reference
point”).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979) (defining public
nuisance).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(a) (1979) (listing factors
that trigger public nuisance claim).  These factors aid courts in determining
whether an actor’s conduct was unreasonable. Id. at cmt. e.  The factors:
Are listed in the disjunctive; any one may warrant a holding of unreasona-
bleness.  They also do not purport to be exclusive.  Some courts have
shown a tendency . . . to treat significant interferences with recognized
aesthetic values or established principles of conservation of natural re-
sources as amounting to public nuisance.
Id.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(c) (1979) (noting character-
istics of conduct rising to public nuisance).
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tentional conduct under a tortious private nuisance analysis.56  This
analysis balances the gravity of the harm suffered by the plaintiff
with the utility of the defendant’s conduct.57  If the gravity of the
harm outweighs the utility of the conduct, the defendant’s activity is
deemed unreasonable and, thus, a public nuisance warranting equi-
table relief.58  The Restatement avers, “Consideration must be given
not only to the interests of the person harmed but also the interests
of the actor and to the community as a whole.”59  In certain public
nuisance actions, legislation may warrant the conduct in question
and, therefore, insulate the defendant from liability.60  Nonethe-
less, these “crystallizations” of legally permissible conduct “should
not obscure the fact that in every case the question is one of reason-
ableness. They are applied only in particular fact situations and are
constantly re-examined in light of changing community conditions
and views.”61  Furthermore, a defendant’s conduct rises to the level
of public nuisance if compensation to the plaintiff for resulting
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1979) (explaining pro-
per common law public nuisance claims analysis).  “If the interference was unin-
tentional, the principles governing negligent or reckless conduct, or abnormally
dangerous activities all embody in some degree the concept of unreasonableness.”
Id.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. a (1979) (discussing applica-
tion of private nuisance analysis to common law public nuisance claim).
58. Id. (describing balance of harm and utility in nuisance analysis).  “The
process of comparing the general utility of the activity with the harm suffered as a
result is adequate if the suit is for an injunction prohibiting the activity.” Id. at
cmt. f.
59. Id. at cmt. c (noting unreasonableness of conduct is determined from ob-
jective point of view).  “Determining unreasonableness is essentially a weighing
process, involving a comparative evaluation of conflicting interests in various situa-
tions according to objective legal standards.” Id.
60. Id. at cmt. d (noting legal rules may insulate defendant from public nui-
sance liability).  The Restatement explains that sometimes “there has been a crys-
tallization of legal opinion as to gravity and utility, with the result that the . . .
[defendant’s actions] are held to be reasonable or unreasonable as a matter of
law.” Id.
61. Id. (emphasizing legal rules that permit potentially harmful conduct must
be assessed under particular facts and reexamined under changing circum-
stances).  These “crystallizations” of legally permissible conduct “may appear in the
form of legislative enactment or it may be the result of a series of judicial deci-
sions.” Id.  Moreover, legislatively enacted permission of certain conduct does not
authorize other activities outside of the specifically approved conduct. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. f (1979).  For instance:
In the case of negligence as a matter of law, the standard defined by a
legislative enactment is normally a minimum standard, applicable to ordi-
nary situations contemplated by legislation. Thus traveling at less than the
speed limit may still be negligence if traffic conditions indicate that a
lesser speed is required . . . The same general principle applies to public
nuisance.
Id.
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harm would place an unbearable burden on the defendant and,
consequently, render the conduct at issue infeasible.62
B. Case Law Framing Public Nuisance Doctrine in an
Environmental Context
In Asian Carp II, the Seventh Circuit recognized several prior
cases as sound applications of public nuisance doctrine in situations
dealing with environmental concerns.63  First, in Missouri v. Illinois
(Missouri I), Missouri sued Illinois in the United States Supreme
Court and requested an injunction, claiming the Sanitary District of
Chicago’s drainage system threatened the health and prosperity of
Missouri’s constituents residing near the Mississippi River.64  The
Court found the threat of polluting the Mississippi River, the main
water source for an area of Missouri, and subsequent threat of ty-
phoid in the region rose to the level of a public nuisance caused by
Chicago’s Sanitary District.65  The Court acknowledged that Mis-
souri’s complaint did not allege the Sanitary District’s conduct vio-
lated its responsibilities prescribed by the state legislature; rather,
the complaint asserted the conduct deemed permissible by Illinois
law would facilitate a public nuisance in the future.66  The purpose
of Missouri’s complaint was “to subject this public work to judicial
supervision, upon the allegation that the method of its construction
and maintenance will create a continuing nuisance.”67
In making its determination, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on
Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp.,68 a case in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court assessed a public nuisance claim as-
serting the defendant’s lowering of water in a public pond would
infringe on the public’s right to enjoy the pond as well as threaten
their health.69  The Massachusetts Supreme Court found that equi-
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (1979) (asserting if required
compensation for harm would inhibit defendant’s conduct, then such conduct is
public nuisance).
63. Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 900 (7th
Cir. 2014) (referring to several environmental public nuisance decisions).
64. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 209-11 (1901) (Missouri I) (discussing
Missouri’s claim and request for injunction).
65. Id. at 246-47 (holding defendants’ demurrers cannot be sustained).  In
Asian Carp II, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that “one state’s introduction of
typhoid into a river that runs off into another state” was an example of a public
nuisance. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 900 (referring to Missouri I).
66. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 241-42 (noting specifics of Missouri’s complaint).
67. Id. (explaining object of Missouri’s complaint).
68. 133 Mass. 361 (1882).
69. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 243 (discussing Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133
Mass. 361 (1882)).  The complaint alleged that the defendant’s conduct would
9
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table relief is meant to “remedy the whole mischief.”70  The Court
averred, “The preventative force of a decree in equity, restraining
the illegal acts before any mischief is done, gives . . . [an] effica-
cious and complete remedy.”71
Next, in Missouri I, the United States Supreme Court discussed
the purpose of equitable relief in comparison to legal remedies.72
The Court emphasized that, in public nuisance cases, courts of eq-
uity can promptly provide a permanent remedy, such as an injunc-
tion, that effectively prevents a threatened nuisance before the
infliction of harm occurs.73  Conversely, courts of law are retroac-
tive and can only provide a remedy after a defendant’s conduct ac-
tually creates a nuisance and inflicts harm on the plaintiff.74  The
Court also noted that, in complaints requesting equitable relief for
a threat of future harm, defendants tend to emphasize the lack of
evidence and tangible proof that such harm will actually reach frui-
tion; this argument, however, does not preclude an injunction.75
“impair the rights of the people in the use of the pond for fishing, boating, and
other lawful purposes, and to create and expose upon the shores of said pond a
large quantity of slime, mud, and offensive vegetation, very detrimental to the pub-
lic health.” Id. at 243-44 (discussing complaint in Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp.,
133 Mass. 361, 362 (1882)).
70. Id. at 244 (examining Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361, 363-
64 (1882)).
71. Id. at 244 (detailing Court’s finding in Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133
Mass. 361, 363-64 (1882)).  The Massachusetts Supreme Court found that “when
the nuisance is a public one, an information by the attorney general is the appro-
priate remedy.” Id. at 244.  An “information in equity” is “an equitable action
brought by a sovereign or a governmental unit to preserve or protect a public
interest through a public remedy.” Black’s Law Dictionary 712 (9th ed. 2009) (clari-
fying “information” is equitable remedy similar to injunction).
72. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 245 (discussing temporal differences of equitable
and legal remedies and correlating effects).
73. Id. (discussing equitable relief for public nuisance claims).  Courts of eq-
uity “can not only prevent nuisances that are threatened, and before irreparable
mischief ensues, but arrest or abate those in progress, and by perpetual injunction
protect the public against them in the future.” Id. at 244 (quoting Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623, 673 (1887)).
74. Id. (discussing retroactive quality of legal remedy).
75. Id. at 245 (acknowledging tendency of defendants to argue relief should
not be rewarded without proof of harm).  The Court explained,
If he [the plaintiff] comes to the court and complains very early . . . you
get evidence after evidence for the defendants (the pollution being slight
and perhaps only observable at sometimes and on some occasions), say-
ing ‘You have no proof at all that there is any appreciable pollution, and
you must wait until it becomes a nuisance.’ Then he waits six years, until
it is obvious to everybody’s sense that the pollution is considerable.
Id. (citation omitted).
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Consequently, in Missouri I, the Supreme Court denied the de-
fendants’ motion to dismiss.76  The Court, however, clarified that
plaintiffs must present satisfactory evidence showing a real and im-
minent threat of harm to effectuate an injunction during the case’s
full adjudication on the merits.77  Moreover, the Court explained
that if the plaintiffs and defendants presented conflicting evidence
that cast doubt on the actuality of the alleged injury, “that conflict
and doubt will be a ground for withholding an injunction.”78
Five years later, in Missouri v. Illinois79 (Missouri II), the Su-
preme Court heard the full merits of the case and held that Mis-
souri’s claim did not suffice to warrant an injunction.80  The Court
based its decision on the fact that the parties presented conflicting
evidence.81  Contrary to Missouri’s claim, the defendants con-
tended that a new drainage plan was implemented since the Court
last examined the case; thus, the sanitary district’s drain water was
“much purer than it was before.”82  Moreover, both parties
presented conflicting expert testimony regarding whether there was
an increase of typhoid disease in the region at issue.83  The Court
also noted that Missouri’s claim was based on “nothing which can
be detected by the unassisted senses.”84  Conversely, the defendants
proved the water at issue was clearer than before, was capable of
sustaining an edible fish population, and was potable.85  Further,
the Court’s finding that Missouri or other states may have contrib-
uted to the pollution weakened the plaintiff State’s claim.86
76. Id. (denying demurrers filed by defendants).  The Supreme Court real-
ized that Missouri’s request for relief was “not merely [against] the creation of a
nuisance, but against its maintenance.” Id. at 248.
77. Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 248 (asserting satisfactory evidence was required for
injunction in future case).
78. Id. (explaining conflicting evidence and doubt of actual injury may disal-
low future injunction).
79. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
80. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 525-26 (1906) (Missouri II) (holding pre-
sent evidence failed to sufficiently prove allegations warranting injunction).
81. Id. at 517, 522-25 (revealing contradictions between parties’ presented
evidence).
82. Id. at 517 (noting defendants’ new contention).
83. Id. at 522-24 (acknowledging typhoid increase was plaintiff’s only tangible
evidence and parties presented conflicting evidence on matter).
84. Id. at 522 (noting lack of tangible proof in plaintiff’s favor).  “The plain-
tiff’s case depends upon an inference of the unseen.” Id.
85. Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 272 (finding defendants’ tangible evidence
persuasive).
86. Id. at 521 (assessing that Missouri may contribute to problem at issue).
“The presence of causes of infection from the plaintiff’s action makes the case
weaker in principle as well as harder to prove than one in which all [pollution]
came from a single source.” Id. at 526.
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Public nuisance doctrine in the environmental realm was char-
acterized further in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,87 a case in which
Georgia sought to enjoin copper plant companies from discharging
noxious gas that traveled over the plaintiff State’s land.88  The U.S.
Supreme Court found the defendant companies’ mode of plant op-
eration facilitated a public nuisance.89  Consequently, the Court
held that Georgia was entitled to an injunction if the defendant
companies could not effectively prevent the spread of their plants’
fumes within six months.90
In making its assessment, the Court acknowledged that a “state
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens,
in all the earth and air within its domain.  It has the last word as to
whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its in-
habitants shall breathe pure air.”91  Further, the U.S. Supreme
Court weighed the threatened irreparable harm to Georgia  against
the potential collapse of the defendants’ businesses, the pollution’s
impact on public health, the wellbeing of Georgia’s forests, and the
commercial practicality of reducing the fumes.92  The Court as-
serted that Georgia should not suffer current or future destruction
to its natural territory by operations beyond its control.93  Accord-
87. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
88. Id. at 236 (discussing complaint that noxious gas traveled from defend-
ants’ copper plants to plaintiffs’ territory).  Before this case was tried by the Su-
preme Court, the plaintiff State’s request for a preliminary injunction was denied,
but an earlier date was fixed for full adjudication of the merits because “there was
ground to fear that great and irreparable damage might be done.” Id.
89. Id. at 238-39 (finding plaintiffs should not suffer from public nuisance
caused by defendants).
90. Id. at 239 (holding plaintiffs deserve  injunction under current circum-
stances).  “[T]here is no alternative to issuing an injunction, after allowing a rea-
sonable time to the defendants to complete the structures that they now are
building, and the efforts that they are making to stop the fumes.” Id.
91. Id. at 238 (explaining State’s interest in protecting its natural territory).
92. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238 (discussing factors under considera-
tion).  The court explained,
Without excluding the considerations that equity always takes into ac-
count, we cannot give the weight that was given them in argument to a
comparison between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and the ca-
lamity of a possible stop to the defendants’ business, the question of
health, the character of the forests as a first or second growth, the com-
mercial possibility or impossibility of reducing the fumes to sulphuric
acid, the special adaptation of the business to the place.
Id.
93. Id. (explaining Georgia was not at fault for copper companies’ actions).
The court reasoned:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of the sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale . . . that the
forests on its mountains . . . and whatever domestic destruction they have
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of per-
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ingly, the Court determined that Georgia provided a requisite show-
ing of future harm to its forests, vegetation, and constituents’
health, which warranted an injunction against the defendants’ cop-
per plant operations.94
C. When Discretionary Legislation Displaces Federal Common
Law
In July 2004, a group of eight States and New York City, in addi-
tion to three non-profit land trusts, sued four private companies
and the Tennessee Valley Authority, “a federally owned corporation
that operated fossil fuel fired power plants in several states.”95
These defendants were notably the “five largest emitters of carbon
dioxide” in the country.96
The plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ carbon dioxide
emissions violated the federal common law of interstate nuisance
due to their contribution to global warming.97  Moreover, the eight
states and New York City asserted that climate change created a risk
to public lands, infrastructure, and health.98  The trusts urged that
animal habitats as well as rare tree and plant species conserved on
their lands were in danger of destruction due to climate change.99
Collectively, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief “requiring each
defendant to cap its carbon dioxide emissions and then reduce
them by a specified percentage each year for at least a decade.”100
Relying on Supreme Court precedent indicating that states may sue
to “abate air and water pollution produced by other states or by out-
of-state” industries, the Second Circuit held the plaintiffs success-
fully stated a claim under the federal common law of public nui-
sons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should
not be endangered from the same source.
Id.
94. Id. at 238-39 (finding that evidence of public nuisance warrants
injunction).
95. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2534-35
(2011) (noting parties to lawsuit).
96. Id. at 2534 (recognizing plaintiffs’ assertion that defendants were exten-
sive contributors to global warming problem).  “Their collective annual emissions
. . . constitute [twenty-five] percent of emissions from the domestic electric power
sector, [ten] percent of emissions from all domestic human activities . . . and [two
and a half] percent of all anthropogenic emissions worldwide.” Id.
97. Id. (discussing plaintiffs’ claim).
98. Id. (stating first plaintiff group’s nuisance concerns).
99. Id. (stating second plaintiff group’s nuisance concerns).
100. American Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (internal quotations omitted) (discuss-
ing plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief).
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sance.101  Further, the Second Circuit held the Clean Air Act did
not “displace” federal common law.102
On appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, the plaintiffs relied
on cases that permitted states to challenge activity detrimental to
the health and welfare of their constituents.103  The defendants,
however, argued that the universal scale and complexity of global
warming distinguishes it from more narrow degrees of pollution
that are generally at issue in federal nuisance suits.104  The Court
“recognized that public nuisance law, like common law generally,
adapts to changing scientific and factual circumstances.”105  The
Court, nevertheless, held the Clean Air Act’s delegation of regula-
tory authority to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) dis-
placed “any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon
dioxide emissions from fossil fuel fired power plants.”106  In reach-
ing its determination, the Court found that the legislation encom-
passed the relief sought by the plaintiffs, giving deference to
Congress’s discretionary power.107  In sum, the Court determined
that “[t]he appropriate amount of regulation . . . cannot be pre-
scribed in a vacuum,” and the balance between environmental ben-
efit and possible economic disruption must be weighed properly.108
The Court, thus, decided the EPA was better suited to make deci-
sions regarding greenhouse gas regulation than individual district
101. See id. at 2534-35 (noting Second Circuit’s holding).
102. Id. (noting Second Circuit’s subsequent ruling).
103. Id. at 2536 (acknowledging precedent relied on by plaintiffs).  The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged that it had never “held that a State may sue to abate
any manner of pollution originating outside its borders.” Id.  Moreover, the Court
never answered whether “the plaintiffs could state a federal common law claim for
curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions because of their contribution to global
warming” due to its final holding that federal common law was displaced. Id. at
2537.
104. Id. at 2536 (stating defendants’ argument against federal public nuisance
claim).
105. American Elec., 131 S. Ct. at 2536 (acknowledging adaptive nature of pub-
lic nuisance law).
106. Id. at 2537 (stating Supreme Court’s holding).
107. Id. at 2538 (discussing Clean Air Act’s purpose).
108. Id. at 2539 (discussing flaws of deciding appropriate environmental regu-
lation in court).  The Court asserted:
The appropriate amount of regulation in any particular greenhouse gas-
producing sector cannot be prescribed in a vacuum, as with other ques-
tions of national . . . policy, informed assessment of competing interests is
required. Along with the environmental benefit potentially achievable,
our Nation’s energy needs and the possibility of economic disruption
must weigh in the balance.
Id.
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judges who lacked the scientific, economic, and technological re-
sources available to the agency.109
D. Asian Carp I: Casting a Line in the Seventh Circuit
Asian Carp II was not the first time the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed the threat carp pose to the Great Lakes.110  In 2011, the
same five states and Native American tribe bordering the Great
Lakes brought a lawsuit against the Corps and District regarding
the migration of Asian carp from the Mississippi River Basin into
Lake Michigan.111 Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Asian
Carp I), reveals the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning at the outset of the
carp problem.112
In the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, the plaintiff States moved for a preliminary injunction “that
would require the defendants to put in place additional physical
barriers throughout the CAWS, implement new procedures to stop
invasive carp, and expedite a study of how best to separate the Mis-
sissippi and Great Lakes watersheds permanently.”113  The plaintiffs
were unable to persuade the District Court that the carp posed a
significant threat to the Great Lakes and their ecosystems as well as
industries relying on them; thus, the District Court denied the re-
quested preliminary injunction.114  Subsequently, the States ap-
pealed to the Seventh Circuit to prove their fears of ecological
disaster and the collapse of billion-dollar industries were
warranted.115
The evidence presented by the States successfully persuaded
the Seventh Circuit that the chance of carp invading the Great
Lakes in a manner rising to the level of public nuisance was
likely.116  The appellate court asserted, “[I]f the invasion comes to
109. Id. at 2539-40 (discussing expert agencies’ suitability to make decisions
rather than district judges).  “Judges may not commission scientific studies or con-
vene groups of experts for advice, or issue rules under notice-and-comment proce-
dures inviting input by any interested person, or seek the counsel of regulators in
the States where the defendants are located.” Id. at 2540.
110. Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 768 (7th
Cir. 2011) (Asian Carp I) (addressing the Asian carp issue in 2011).
111. Id. at 768-69 (noting plaintiffs’ concern of carp’s threat to Great Lakes).
112. Id. at 769 (discussing Seventh Circuit’s reasoning on carp issue leading
up to the case at hand).
113. Id. (noting plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction).
114. Id. (noting District Court’s denial of preliminary injunction).
115. Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 768-69 (discussing plaintiffs’ appeal due to fear
of carp invasion’s consequences).
116. Id. at 769 (revealing Seventh Circuit’s belief that carp stand to invade
Great Lakes and such qualifies as public nuisance).
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pass, there is little doubt that the harm to the plaintiff [S]tates
would be irreparable.”117  The Corps and District argued that they
could not be sued under a federal common law public nuisance
claim because they merely owned and operated the CAWS connect-
ing the Mississippi River Basin to the Great Lakes.118  The court,
however, found that, while the defendants were not physically mov-
ing carp from one body of water to the other, they were still respon-
sible for nuisances caused by their operation of the CAWS.119  Still,
the defendants emphasized that they never emitted “traditional pol-
lutants” into the water systems.120  After comparing the invasive spe-
cies to a toxic spill, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the carp
qualified as a public nuisance.121
In Asian Carp I, the Seventh Circuit stressed that the plaintiffs’
request was for a preliminary injunction, rather than a permanent
injunction; thus, the States only had to prove “a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits rather than actual success.”122  While the plaintiff
States sufficiently proved that Asian carp pose a threat of irrepara-
ble harm, the Seventh Circuit was primarily concerned with
whether such harm was imminent enough to require the defend-
ants to take new action that would effectively abate the public nui-
sance before full adjudication of the case’s merits.123
In making its determination regarding the threat’s temporal
proximity, the court assessed several factors.124  The court found
that certain measures implemented by the Corps, including electric
barriers, netting, electrofishing, and rotenone poisoning, had “at
least some deterrent effect” on the carp’s lakeward movement.125
Moreover, a 2010 eDNA sampling showed positive results indicating
117. Id. (finding carp’s invasion stands to inflict irreparable harm).
118. Id. at 771 (discussing defendants’ belief that common law does not ex-
tend to their situation).
119. Id. (showing defendants’ operation of CAWS renders them responsible
should public nuisance arise).
120. Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 771 (noting defendants’ argument that they
merely operated facilities that allowed invasive species to freely travel).
121. Id. (finding carp qualify as public nuisance despite traditional
examples).
122. Id. at 782 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,
546 n. 12 (1987)).
123. Id. 781 (stating central question of States’ public nuisance claim).
124. Id. at 783-86 (assessing factors that suggest imminence of invasion).
125. Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 783 (noting preventative procedures used by
Corps).  Considering the results of eDNA testing, the court realized the impossibil-
ity of definitively knowing whether positive results indicate the presence of living
carp lakeward of electronic barriers, but gave some weight to the plaintiffs’ evi-
dence because even the defendants and other federal agencies utilize eDNA test-
ing to monitor the carp. Id. at 783-84.  The court found, “If the tests are good
16
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the presence of carp in approximately a dozen areas of the
CAWS.126  Despite the common consensus in 2011 that the carp
would not be able to thrive in the Great Lakes, the Seventh Circuit
relied on information presented by the Obama Administration and
found that once the carp migrate beyond the Great Lakes’ thresh-
old, they will not have any problem adapting, reproducing, or es-
tablishing themselves there.127  Additionally, the court noted that,
in 2009, a carp population existed about sixty miles from Lake
Michigan.128
The Seventh Circuit ultimately found that the risk of harm was
significant and the threat of invasion was imminent.129  Conse-
quently, the court determined that a satisfactory risk of nuisance
existed to satisfy the “likelihood-of-success” requirement for prelim-
inary injunctive relief.130  In addition, the court recognized that the
ecological impact of the threatened harm suggested the need for a
broad perspective of the carp problem.131  The Seventh Circuit em-
phasized that “[i]t is especially chilling to recall that in just . . .
[forty] years the fish have migrated all the way from the lower Mis-
enough for expert agencies, it is hard to see why we should flatly forbid their con-
sideration.” Id. at 784.
126. Id. (acknowledging 2010 eDNA test results as indication of carp
presence).
The district court thought that this evidence, in combination with the
discovery of two invasive carp specimens (one dead and one living) in the
CAWS, supported a theory that invasive carp are present in the CAWS in
‘low numbers.’  This conclusion was reasonable.  The carp may even be
present in larger numbers but for present purposes we do not need any
more precision.
Id.
127. Id. at 784-85 (finding carp would not have any problem thriving in Great
Lakes).  On April 24, 2011, the Obama Administration presented two pieces of
newly developed information.
[F]irst, it said that while it was once thought the carp could not establish
breeding populations in Lake Michigan because of the low levels of
plankton (the carp’s normal food source) . . . new evidence suggests that
the fish will happily switch from eating plankton to consuming green al-
gae that now covers the lake floor . . . and (2) while experts had thought
the carp needed coastal rivers between [thirty] and [sixty] miles long to
spawn, it turns out they can make do with much shorter breeding
grounds.
Id.
128. Id. at 785 (noting carp presence was sixty miles from Lake Michigan in
2009).
129. Id. (noting risk of substantial harm may be growing with each passing
day).
130. Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 785 (finding States’ evidence combined with
magnitude of harm fulfilled “likelihood-of-success” requirement).
131. Id. (acknowledging nature of threat).  The court viewed the sixty-mile
distance between the carp and Lake Michigan in 2009 as an unsafe margin. Id.
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sissippi River to within striking distance of the lakes and have come
to dominate the ecosystem in the process.”132  Accordingly, the
court found the plaintiffs successfully established the likelihood of
impending irreparable harm to the degree necessary for prelimi-
nary relief.133
Next, the court decided whether ordering a preliminary in-
junction would cause the defendants harm that would substantially
outweigh the benefit to the plaintiffs.134  The Seventh Circuit held
that a preliminary injunction would cause more harm than it would
prevent.135  In reaching its conclusion, the court found that the
vague steps suggested by the plaintiffs might not effectively reduce
the risk of invasion before the full merits of the case were subse-
quently adjudicated.136  Furthermore, the court found that a pre-
liminary injunction would be costly for the defendants and would
hinder existing emergency response units and the Coast Guard as
well as recreation and tourism.137
Notably, the Seventh Circuit found that federal legislation re-
garding the navigability of waterways and aquatic nuisance species
did not displace federal common law.138  The court recognized that
the statutes enacted by Congress regarding the invasive species
problem did not meet the same level of particular authority granted
to the EPA in American Electric.139  Rather, the relevant legislation
merely appropriated funds to the Corps for routine maintenance of
132. Id. (discussing carp’s rapid travel and dominating presence).  Addition-
ally, the court noted the commercial harvesting of carp in the Mississippi basin
increased from five to fifty-five tons between 1994 and 1997. Id.  Also, the court
looked at evidence suggesting “that by 1999 invasive carp made up . . . [ninety-
seven percent] of the Mississippi’s biomass; and as of 2007[,] commercial fishers
were catching . . . [twelve] tons of invasive carp each day.” Id.
133. Id. at 789 (finding plaintiffs established likelihood of irreparable harm).
134. Id. (describing need to balance party-specific equities).  Additionally, the
court found that the usual inquiry of whether the injunction would advance or
impede the public interest was unnecessary because the defendants are govern-
mental entities that inherently represent the interests of the public. Id.
135. Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 789 (finding preliminary injunction was not
warranted).
136. Id. at 789-94 (assessing whether suggested steps such as closing locks,
putting screens over sluice gates, placing block nets in rivers, rotenone poisoning,
and accelerating Corps’ completion of Report would reduce risk of invasion).
137. Id. at 795 (assessing harm preliminary injunction would cause to defend-
ants and public).
138. Id. at 776-80 (assessing whether legislation displaced federal common
law in this area).
139. Id. at 778-79 (finding “congressional efforts to curb the migration of in-
vasive species, and of invasive carp in particular, have yet to reach the level of detail
one sees in the air or water pollution schemes”); see also American Elec. Power Co.
v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2011)  (holding EPA actions displace federal
common law).
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the CAWS and granted agencies or, more commonly, informal task
forces the authority to study the invasive species problem and pro-
pose solutions.140
The Seventh Circuit, however, emphasized that federal and
state actors were contemporaneously working to prevent the carp
invasion.141  In the tradition of American Electric, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned that it was less equipped to decide the proper method for
alleviating the carp problem than expert agencies currently work-
ing to avert the invasion.142  The court decided that a preliminary
injunction might hamper existing efforts.143  Finally, the Seventh
Circuit suggested, “[a]s the case proceeds, the district judge should
bear in mind that the risk of harm here depends upon both the
probability of the harm and the magnitude of the problem that
would result.”144
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S CATCH AND
RELEASE OF THE ASIAN CARP PROBLEM
In Asian Carp II, the Seventh Circuit found that public nui-
sance actions arise when an actor’s conduct negatively affects a pub-
lic right.145  Moreover, the court determined that federal entities
are not immune from nuisance liability because public nuisance
doctrine does not discriminate among culpable actors.146  As long
as a public right is endangered, the entity that caused the harm is
accountable for its misconduct.147
The court chronologically analyzed statutes that authorized the
Corps and District to maintain and operate the CAWS, and, in do-
ing so, it abrogated the defendants’ and district court’s assertion
140. Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 780 (discussing legislation in relevant area).
141. See id. at 796 (giving final reason why preliminary injunction would cause
harm).
142. See id. at 796-99 (discussing agency efforts to prevent invasion).  “Envi-
ronmental problems require the balancing of many complicated interests, and
agencies are better suited to weigh competing proposals and select among solu-
tions.” Id. at 797.
143. See id. at 799 (deciding preliminary injunction might impede existing
efforts).
144. Id. at 800 (stating Seventh Circuit’s suggestion).
145. See Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 900-01
(7th Cir. 2014) (noting when public nuisance complaints arise).
146. See id. (finding federal entities are not immune under public nuisance
doctrine).
147. See id. (explaining when public nuisance defendants are held accounta-
ble).  Additionally, the court disclaims the view that “the federal common law doc-
trine of public nuisance exists only to create a uniform rule for resolving disputes
between states in a way that comports with the national interest.” Id. at 899.
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that the series of statutes indicate a congressional mandate to keep
the CAWS open no matter the cost, environmental or otherwise.148
Further, the court found that, while the statutes imposed a “duty to
operate and maintain the CAWS in the interests of navigation,”149
there was no indication that legislative intent “requires the Corps to
keep the CAWS open for navigation at all times and under all cir-
cumstances.”150  The Seventh Circuit explained that the relevant
statutory authority merely implied the Corps should facilitate navi-
gation to the best of its ability under existing conditions.151  The
court also found that the Corps and the District are not “fully au-
thorized” to keep the CAWS open without regard for the potential
invasion of Asian carp into the Great Lakes.152  The fact that the
defendants are authorized to operate and maintain the CAWS does
not justify any unlawful consequences that may stem from their con-
duct, including the permission of a rapacious species’ migration
into the Great Lakes.153
After concluding that federal entities may be held accountable
for endangering a public right, the Seventh Circuit still had to de-
cide whether the Corps and District’s operation of the CAWS is a
facilitating cause of the impending carp invasion.154  Despite ac-
knowledging the Second Restatement of Torts’ role in federal com-
mon law’s public nuisance doctrine; referencing Missouri I, Missouri
II, and Tennessee Copper Co. as relevant case law; and deeming Ameri-
can Electric inapplicable, the court primarily relied on the defendant
agencies’ past efforts and the Corps’ Report in making its final de-
termination.155  The court reasoned that “the manner of operation
148. See id. at 901-02 (rejecting defendants’ “congressional mandate” argu-
ment and reasoning behind District Court’s holding).
149. Id. at 902-03 (discussing District Court’s reliance on original Rivers and
Harbors Act, Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of December 4,
1981, and Supplemental Appropriations Act of July 30, 1983).
150. Id. at 903  (distinguishing legislative intent from defendants’ argument).
151. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 902 (finding Corps’ duty entails facilitation
of navigation).  “Even the original Rivers and Harbors Act cannot fairly be under-
stood as a mandate to force the waterway to remain open to navigation even if
there is an oil spill, or if the waters have become contaminated with some kind of
noxious bacteria.” Id.
152. Id. at 903 (rejecting “fully authorized” argument).  Further, the court
reasoned that because the Corps and District are not immune from public nui-
sance liability, “it follows that the Corps’ duty to operate a navigable waterway does
not ‘fully authorize’ it to create the nuisance alleged in the States’ complaint.” Id.
153. See id. (explaining defendants’ authorization to operate CAWS does not
authorize any resulting adverse consequences).
154. See id. at 904 (acknowledging question of whether alleged facts demon-
strate defendants’ cause of public nuisance).
155. See id. (discussing Restatement’s role in federal common law); see id. at
899 (referring to prior environmental public nuisance decisions); see id. at 897
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involves more than maintenance of a manmade waterway between
the Mississippi River and Lake Michigan.  It also involves the steps
that the Corps is taking and has already taken” to prevent Asian
carp from penetrating the Great Lakes’ threshold.156  Furthermore,
the court pointed to the Corps’ implementation of electronic barri-
ers, installation of screens on sluice gates, application of rotenone
when potential threats arose, and regular monitoring activity as evi-
dence of the Corps’ proactive efforts to combat the migration of
Asian carp toward Lake Michigan.157
The Seventh Circuit emphasized the Corps’ issuance of the
“Great Lakes and Mississippi River Interbasin Study Report” as an
indication of its preemptive diligence in crafting a plan to inhibit
the carp’s intrusion even though the defendant agency was forced
to compile the Report by a 2012 mandate under the Progress
Act.158  The Corps released the Report two weeks before the Sev-
enth Circuit heard oral arguments in Asian Carp II.159  Moreover,
the court recognized the Corps’ prediction that, without the imple-
mentation of extra measures, there is a “ ‘medium’ risk of Asian
carp establishing themselves in the Great Lakes within 25 years.”160
In the Report, the Corps explained that a “medium risk” indicates
the carp’s invasion is “likely but not certain.”161  The Corps also as-
serted that there is a “low risk” of invasion within the next twenty-
five years.162  Relying on the information gathered by the Corps in
the Report, the court decided  the manner in which the Corps and
District currently operate the CAWS is sufficient to prevent the
Asian carp from passing into the Great Lakes.163
(noting 2012 Progress Act furthered 2007 Water Resources Development Act’s de-
mand that Corps compile Report).
156. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 894 (expanding on defendants’ “manner of
operation”).
157. Id. (noting preventative steps taken by Corps).  “The defendants have
been diligent in their efforts to operate a waterway that blocks the passage of Asian
carp to Lake Michigan.” Id.
158. See id. at 896 (expressing importance of Corps’ issuance of Report); see
also id. at 897 (discussing 2012 Progress Act mandate for Corps’ issuance of
Report).
159. See id. at 897 (noting publication date of Report).
160. Id. (acknowledging Corps’ risk assessment of invasion).
161. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 897 (noting court’s understanding of what
Corps meant by “medium risk” and noting Corps’ short-term risk assessment of
invasion).
162. Id. at 898 (noting Corps’ short-term risk assessment of invasion).
163. See id. at 904-05 (relying on information in Report in determining Corps’
current methods are sufficient).  In sum, the court found “a notable lack of factual
allegations that the Asian carp are passing or about to pass the barriers that the
Corps has established, and the [States’] complaint does not plausibly allege that
21
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The court was tasked with weighing several factors in making
its determination.164  The States’ belief “that nothing short of hy-
drological separation will prevent the spread of Asian carp from the
Mississippi to the Great Lakes” complicated the amount of clout
their equitable relief request held due to its alleged impractical-
ity.165  On the contrary, the court relied heavily on the Corps and
District’s “intensive efforts” as well as hydrological separation con-
cerns expressed by the defendants (i.e. water quality, navigation,
public enjoyment, and cost).166  The Seventh Circuit stated, “it is
the defendants’ apparent diligence, rather than their claimed help-
lessness that is key to our holding today.”167
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit deduced that the States’
“complaint [was] careful not to ask for the barrier itself” because
the Rivers and Harbors Act would undoubtedly bar the court from
issuing an injunction requiring construction of a structure for the
purpose of hydrological separation.168  Because the complaint re-
quested an injunction “to take all appropriate and necessary mea-
sures to expeditiously develop and implement plans to permanently
and physically separate [the waterways],” the Seventh Circuit found
that such an injunction would be “an extraordinary and likely inap-
propriate use of a federal court’s equitable powers.”169  Accord-
ingly, the court reasoned that the requested injunction would
the Corps cannot or will not respond to more urgent threats if and when they
arise.” Id. at 905.
164. See id. at 905-07 (discussing factors weighed by Seventh Circuit).
165. Id. at 905-06 (showing how plaintiffs’ unwieldy request seemed to
weaken their entire claim).  The court reasoned, “We know there is no quick fix
here.  Under these conditions, it would take an unusually strong showing to meet
the requirements for equitable relief.” Id.
166. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905, 907 (discussing role of defendants’
exemplified efforts and their concerns associated with hydrological separation in
court’s determination).  The Seventh Circuit found that “[t]he Corps and the Dis-
trict . . . are engaged in intensive efforts to prevent the carp from reaching the
Great Lakes, and there is a great deal of evidence that indicates they have suc-
ceeded thus far in doing so.” Id.  Further, “[t]he complaint does not present facts
that, if believed, would show that hydrological separation is the only way to prevent
the spread of the Asian carp.” Id. (emphasis original).
167. Id. at 906 (acknowledging defendants’ “diligence”).
168. Id.  (analyzing legislative purpose of Rivers and Harbors Act and showing
difference between States’ request in complaint and what they sought in practice).
“A court could not direct the Corps to build a dam in contravention of the Act,
because ‘[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional re-
quirements and provisions than courts of law.’” Id. (quoting Hedges v. Dixon
County, 150 U.S. 182 (1893)).  In sum, the Rivers and Harbors Act disallows the
construction of barriers that would impede commercial navigation without Con-
gress’s consent. Id.
169. Id. at 907 (noting injunction would likely be improper use of court’s
equitable powers).
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require the Corps “to exercise its discretion of a certain plan and
essentially . . . lobby Congress to adopt and provide funds for that
plan.”170  In conclusion, the Seventh Circuit decided that the
States’ complaint failed to “plausibly allege that the Corps and Dis-
trict are creating a current or imminent public nuisance by their
manner of operating the CAWS.”171  Therefore, the court held that
the plaintiff States “failed to state a claim under which relief can be
granted.”172
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS: TANGLING THE REEL UNDER PUBLIC
NUISANCE DOCTRINE
In Asian Carp II, the Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the Corps
and District’s past and present preventative efforts in reaching its
final holding does not logically follow its previous reasoning.173  In
Asian Carp I, the court properly found that legislation granting in-
formal task forces authority to research the invasive carp problem
and propose solutions did not amount to displacement of federal
common law.174  Under that finding, the States were not barred
from asserting a public nuisance claim against the Corps and Dis-
trict in Asian Carp II.175  The court’s final determination, however,
mirrored the rationale set forth in American Electric; failed to con-
sider environmental public nuisance cases such as Missouri I, Mis-
souri II, and Tennessee Copper Co.; and effectively allowed legislation
to override federal common law.176
Based on the specious diligence exemplified by the Corps, the
court determined that the defendants were best suited to deal with
the carp problem internally.177  As a result, the Seventh Circuit
failed to provide the defendants with any instruction regarding fu-
170. Id. at 907 (assessing what States’ request would actually entail).
171. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905 (holding States’ complaint does not show
Corps and District’s operations are cause of alleged imminent public nuisance).
172. Id. at 907 (holding plaintiffs failed to state claim warranting equitable
relief).
173. For a discussion of the court’s contradictions, see supra notes 154-63 and
accompanying text.
174. For a discussion of the relevant legislation, see supra notes 138-40, 148-53
and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of the nuisance claim, see supra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
176. For a further discussion of the court’s determination, see supra notes
154-57 and accompanying text.
177. Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 907 (7th
Cir. 2014) (finding future prevention of invasion should be left to defendants’
judgment).
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ture prevention of the carp’s invasion.178  This determination is ef-
fectively equivalent to legislative displacement of federal nuisance
law and, therefore, contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s previous find-
ing.179  Moreover, the court emphatically relied on the Report as
evidence of the defendants’ satisfactory operation of the CAWS and
their competent ability to address the carp problem in the
future.180
The Corps, a defendant in the suit, personally compiled the
Report, and, thus, the court relied on biased material as determina-
tive evidence.181  The fact that the Corps and District contended
that they essentially maintained a congressional mandate and were
“fully authorized” to operate the CAWS regardless of the environ-
mental cost implies their predisposition, conscious or not, to re-
frain from drastically changing their current mode of operation.182
Also, the Report’s finding that the risk of Asian carp reaching the
Great Lakes is “low” for the next twenty-five years and “medium”
(“likely but not certain”) after that time lapse is disconcerting.183
In light of the defendants’ current preemptive procedures, the
Corps’ risk assessment in the Report is seemingly unfounded based
on the fact that the invasive carp traveled from the lower Mississippi
River to within sixty miles of Lake Michigan by 2009, eviscerating
the ecosystem along the way, and, further, established a population
as near as six miles from Lake Michigan by 2010.184
The Seventh Circuit avoided a full public nuisance analysis of
the issue by finding that the defendants were in the best position to
determine the proper preventative method and subsequently hold-
ing that the plaintiff States failed to assert a claim for which relief
can be granted.185  An application of the proper public nuisance
analysis set forth in the Second Restatement of Torts suggests there
is sufficient evidence of the defendants’ facilitation of an inevitable
178. Id. (determining Corps’ current methods are satisfactory).
179. For a further discussion of legislative displacement of federal common
law, see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
180. For a further discussion of the court’s reliance on the Report, see supra
notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
181. For a further discussion of the Report’s creation, see supra notes 32-38
and accompanying text.
182. For a further discussion of the defendants’ argument, see supra notes
146-53 and accompanying text.
183. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 897-98 (noting Report’s risk assessment).
184. Id. (discussing Report’s findings regarding invasion risk probability). See
also Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d 765, 785 (7th Cir.
2011) (finding carp within sixty miles of Lake Michigan in 2009).
185. For a further discussion of the court’s reasoning and consequent incom-
plete analysis, see supra notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
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public nuisance under past, current, and, now, future circum-
stances.186  Under the Restatement’s analysis, the court should con-
sider the gravity of the harm suffered by the plaintiff States, their
constituents, the industries relying on the Great Lakes’ vitality, and
the public as a whole.187  Furthermore, the court should balance
those factors against the utility of the Corps and District’s continu-
ing operation and maintenance of the CAWS.188
In determining the gravity of the harm, the court must objec-
tively consider the extent and character of the harm, the social
value the law attaches to the inhibited use or enjoyment, the suita-
bility of the use or enjoyment to the locality at issue, and the bur-
den of avoiding the harm placed on those deprived of their use and
enjoyment.189  The extent of the harm caused by the carp invasion
would be significant because it would perpetually interrupt the fish-
ing and tourism industries of the plaintiff States as well as the pub-
lic’s use and enjoyment of the Great Lakes.190  The evisceration of
ecosystems and domination of water systems already suffering from
the aquatic nuisance, such as the Mississippi River Basin, character-
ize the harm inflicted by the carp’s invasion.191
In assessing the gravity of the harm, the social value attributed
to the inhibited use or enjoyment is a central consideration.192  The
impacted parties’ beneficial uses of the Great Lakes for industrial
purposes such as tourism, business (i.e. commercial fishing), and
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292, 821B, 826-828 (1979) (es-
tablishing proper public nuisance analysis).  For a further discussion of the defend-
ants’ past and ongoing preventative efforts, see supra notes 25-31, 157 and
accompanying text.
187. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 894 (discussing impending harm). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292, 821B, 826-828 (1979) (discussing proper
public nuisance analysis).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 292, 821B, 826-828 (1979) (ex-
plaining public nuisance analysis).
189. Id. § 827(a)-(e) (1979) (listing factors for determining gravity of harm).
These rules “usually are . . . applied to conduct resulting in a public nuisance.” Id.
at cmt. a.
190. See id. at cmt. c (explaining extent of harm assessment).  “The extent of
harm in a particular case depends not only upon the degree of interference with
the use or enjoyment . . . but also upon its duration.” Id.
191. See id. at cmt. d (discussing character of harm assessment).  “Physical
damage . . . involves a more tangible obvious loss than discomfort and annoy-
ance . . . Furthermore, if the invasion involves physical damage . . . the gravity of
the harm is ordinarily regarded as great.” Id.
192. See id. at cmt. f (explaining importance of social value in assessment).
“The greater the general social value of the particular type of use or enjoyment of
land which is invaded, the greater the gravity of the harm from the invasion.” Id.
25
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recreation have an intrinsic social value.193  Generally, any interfer-
ence with these types of uses is considered serious because they ad-
vance and protect the public good.194
The Great Lakes are a suitable locality for the affected uses at
issue.195  Fishing, tourism, and recreation are timelessly connected
to the water system.196  The carp’s destruction of the ecosystem in-
volved, which upholds an innate environmental value itself, would
deprive traditional industries of billions of dollars in revenue and
extinguish the recreational enjoyment of countless members of the
public community.197  These uses are inextricable from the defini-
tive nature of the Great Lakes and cannot be transferred or repli-
cated if the Asian carp invasion comes to fruition because there is
not a comparable water system in the world, let alone this specific
locality.198  Consequently, the burden of avoiding the harm is great
considering the carp’s intrusion would plague the entire water sys-
tem and alternative avenues of replicating the Great Lakes’ uses are
nonexistent.199
On the contrary, to determine the utility of the Corps and Dis-
trict’s operation and maintenance of the CAWS, a combination of a
public nuisance analysis and negligence analysis should be ap-
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827(a)-(e) (1979) (discussing
beneficial uses with correlating social value).
194. Id. (explaining social value level derives from use’s relation to public
good).  These types of use “are essential to the functioning of organized society
and substantial interferences with them under almost any circumstances are rela-
tively serious.  How much social value a particular type of use has . . . depends
upon the extent to which . . . [it] advances or protects the general public good.”
Id.
195. For a further description of the features of Great Lakes and monetary
harm to traditional industries, see supra notes 1, 41-42 and accompanying text.
196. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 894  (noting deprivation of public right).
For a general discussion of the water system’s importance and features, see Physical
Features of Great Lakes, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
197. For a further discussion of potential harm, see supra notes 41-42 and
accompanying text.
198. For a further discussion of the history of Great Lakes, see Physical Features
of Great Lakes, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 at cmt. i (discussing assess-
ment of affected parties avoidance of the harm).
This factor of the burden to the person harmed of avoiding the harm is
not often decisive as to gravity.  It merely embodies the common sense
idea that persons living in society must make a reasonable effort to adjust
their uses . . . to those of their fellowmen before complaining that they
are being unreasonably interfered with in what they are doing.
Id.
26
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plied.200  The Corps and District’s past operation of the CAWS un-
intentionally facilitated the carp’s migration thus far.201
Additionally, the defendants are now aware that there is a signifi-
cant chance their current and future maintenance will allow the
carp to establish a population in the Great Lakes.202  In determin-
ing the utility of the defendants’ conduct, this hybrid analysis en-
compasses all relevant inquiries.203
Under a public nuisance analysis, the court must consider the
social value the law attaches to the facilitation of navigability in the
CAWS, the suitability of aquatic navigation for commercial purposes
to the locality at issue, and the impracticality of preventing or avoid-
ing the establishment of an Asian carp population in the Great
Lakes.204  The only effective addition to this assessment, taken from
negligence analysis, inquires whether alternative means exist that
advance or protect the commercial navigability of the CAWS by an-
other, less dangerous course of conduct.205
200. See id. at cmt. c (explaining appropriateness of private nuisance analysis
when harm is knowingly inflicted and appropriateness of negligence analysis when
harm is unknowingly inflicted).
201. For a further discussion of defendants’ conduct, see supra notes 25-31,
157 and accompanying text.
202. See Asian Carp I, 667 F.3d at 768-69 (discussing findings regarding threat
of carp).
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 (1979) cmt. c (explaining
difference between intentional and unintentional harm analyses).  The utility of
conduct section of a public nuisance analysis only deals with situations where the
actor knowingly inflicts harm. Id.  “Although the problem of determining utility in
these cases is fundamentally the same as in negligence cases, the factors involved
are somewhat different, since in negligence cases the actor’s conduct involves
merely a risk rather than certainty of harm.” Id.
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828(a)-(c) (1979) (listing consid-
erations that determine utility of defendants’ conduct).  The Restatement asserts
that these considerations and rules are commonly used to assess:
conduct that results in a public nuisance case . . . Thus, in determining
whether the gravity of the interference with the public right outweighs
the utility of the actor’s conduct, it is necessary to consider the social
value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct, the
suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality and the impracti-
cability of preventing or avoiding the invasion.
Id. at cmt. a.  Moreover, under this nuisance analysis, it is only when the defend-
ants’ conduct
has utility from the standpoint of all the factors as a whole that its merit is
ever sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the harm it causes. If the con-
duct has no utility from the standpoint of one of the factors, the fact that
it has utility from the standpoint of other factors is not controlling.
Id. at cmt. c.
205. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292(a)-(c) (1979) (inquiring
whether defendants’ interest can be advanced or protected by alternative course of
conduct).  Under a negligence assessment, the court considered the social value of
the defendants’ conduct, which is effectively covered by a public nuisance analysis.
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There is ample support for concluding that the law attaches
significant social value to commercial navigation within the
CAWS.206  Commercial navigation is “an interest which is primarily
of private advantage, but the public may nonetheless be interested,
not merely as the protector of the private interest, but also because
the general public good is advanced.”207  Furthermore, legal sup-
port of navigation in the CAWS dates back to the waterway’s con-
struction.208  Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1930,
which called for the CAWS’s development as “a commercially useful
waterway.”209  In the Energy and Water Development Appropria-
tions Act of 1981, Congress provided funding to the Corps for the
operation and maintenance of the CAWS in the “interest of naviga-
tion.”210  Accordingly, in Asian Carp II, the Seventh Circuit acknowl-
edged “the obvious point that Congress considered navigation
when it funded construction of structures on the CAWS.”211  Thus,
it is easy to conclude that the law attaches significant social value to
the defendants’ facilitation of navigation within the CAWS.212
Under the Restatement, however, the court must assess the con-
duct’s social value in light of “the community standards of relative
social value prevailing at the time and place.”213  Moreover, the Sev-
See id. at § 292(a).  The second negligence factor inquires whether aquatic naviga-
tion will be advanced by the defendants’ operation of the CAWS, and, based on
past representation, the answer is intuitively affirmative. See id. at § 292(b).
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. d (1979) (explaining
what constitutes “primary purpose of conduct”).  “In most cases the actor does not
want to invade the interests of others. He is primarily concerned with the pursuit
of his own interests and the invasion . . . is merely incidental to his main objective.”
Id.
207. Id. at cmt. e (discussing social value of private interest).
208. Michigan v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 758 F.3d 892, 902-03
(7th Cir. 2014) (noting navigation was primary purpose of CAWS’s construction at
“waterway’s infancy”).
209. Id. (noting legislative intent behind CAWS’s construction).
210. Id. (noting Congress’s 1981 funding of CAWS’s operation and mainte-
nance in the interest of navigation); see also Supplemental Appropriations Act of
July 30, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301 (reaffirming legislative interest in
navigation).  “[T]he appropriations provision in the 1981 Act ‘pertaining to main-
tenance and operation . . . of the Illinois Waterway in the interest of navigation . . .
includes . . . facilities as are necessary to sustain through navigation from Chicago
Harbor on Lake Michigan to Lockport on the Des Plaines River.’” Asian Carp II,
758 F.3d at 903.
211. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 903 (noting Congress’s interest in navigation in
CAWS).
212. For an assessment of the social value of defendants’ conduct, see supra
notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. b (1979) (explaining
court must assess social value in accordance with contemporary community
interests).
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enth Circuit asserted that “the Corps must try to facilitate naviga-
tion; that is all. Even the original Rivers and Harbors Act cannot
fairly be understood as a mandate to force the waterway to remain
open to navigation even if there is an oil spill, or if the waters have
become contaminated with some kind of noxious bacteria.”214
Further, aquatic navigation for commercial purposes is defini-
tively suitable to the character of the CAWS due to legislative intent
and the waterway’s natural attributes.215  While the Corps and Dis-
trict’s interest in facilitating navigation is similar to other predomi-
nant activities carried out in the CAWS, it is not necessarily
justified.216  Indeed, conduct “may or may not be reasonable de-
pending on the gravity of the harm involved.”217
The determination of whether it would be impracticable for
the defendants to prevent or avoid the aquatic nuisance invasion is
essential to the outcome of Asian Carp II because the plaintiff
States’ request called for the Corps and District to take steps to-
wards hydrological separation.218  Under the Restatement’s analy-
sis, hydrological separation is impracticable because it would
subject the Corps and District to prohibitive expense and hard-
ship.219  Nonetheless, even when a public nuisance is practicably
The amount of utility that the particular conduct has depends primarily
upon the amount of social value that the law attaches to its primary pur-
pose . . . and this is necessarily indefinite because of the fact that there is
often no uniformly acceptable scale or standard of social values to which
courts can refer.
Id.
214. Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 902-03 (analyzing legislative intent).
215. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 at cmt. g (1979) (explaining
determination of suitability of locality).  “The character of a locality depends upon
the type of activity to which it is primarily devoted.” Id.
216. See id. (explaining suitability is determined by assessing other predomi-
nant activities carried out in locality at issue).  “The mere fact that the activity or
inactivity is suitable does not mean that the invasion it causes is thus made reasona-
ble and justified.” Id.
217. See id. (explaining conduct’s suitability does not override gravity of harm
it inflicts).
218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. h (1979) (explaining
when prevention of harm is impracticable); see also Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905-06
(explaining why Seventh Circuit denied States’ request for hydrological separa-
tion).  “We know that there is no quick fix here. Under these conditions, it would
take an unusually strong showing to meet the requirements for equitable relief.
The complaint does not present facts that . . . show that hydrological separation is
the only way to prevent the spread of the Asian carp.” Id. (emphasis original).
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. h (1979) (explaining
what constitutes impracticable avoidance of harm).
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unavoidable, the defendants’ conduct “is not justified if the gravity
of the harm is too great.”220
Finally, while there is no direct alternative to commercial navi-
gability within the CAWS, it may be beneficial to consider alterna-
tive measures that could advance the commercial purpose
underlying the defendants’ interest in facilitating aquatic naviga-
tion.221  In light of developments in transportation availability and
efficiency since the construction of the CAWS as well as the current
Asian carp problem, contemporary public concerns might call for
navigation in the CAWS to be supplanted by other means of com-
mercial transportation.222  For instance, the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1956 created a transcontinental interstate highway system
and cargo transportation by aircraft emerged in the 1960s.223
Implementing hydrological separation and supplanting naviga-
tion in the CAWS with alternative modes of commercial transporta-
tion are drastic, and, thus, seemingly impracticable measures.224
These substitute recourses are, however, at the very least, available
for consideration.225  Alternatively, the past and current demonstra-
tion of the Corps and District’s preventative efforts as well as their
studies compiled in the Report suggest that no other means guaran-
teeing the vitality of the Great Lakes besides hydrological separa-
tion exist.226
The Seventh Circuit had the difficult task of choosing between:
(1) the ensured vitality of the Great Lakes, their ecosystems, and
the correlating use and enjoyment of the water system and; (2) the
preservation of the defendant entities’ interest in continuing facili-
220. See id. (emphasizing impracticality of avoiding harm does not justify de-
fendants’ conduct in light of significant gravity of harm inflicted).
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 292 cmt. c (1979) (suggesting
alternative means of achieving primary interest may be beneficial).
222. See id. (explaining if defendants can further their interest by alternative
means, their conduct is unreasonable).
223. See Richard F. Weingroff, Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956: Creating the In-
terstate System, PUBLIC ROADS (Summer 1996), available at http://www.fhwa.
dot.gov/publications/publicroads/96summer/p96su10.cfm (discussing develop-
ment of interstate highway system); see also The History of Air Freight, CENTURY OF
FLIGHT, http://www.century-of-flight.net/new%20site/commercial/history%20of
%20air%20freight.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (discussing development of air
freight transportation).  “In March 1964, United became the first airline in the
country to offer non-stop transcontinental all-cargo service.” Id.
224. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of hydro-
logical separation’s alleged impracticability.
225. See supra notes 221-26 for a discussion of alternative commercial trans-
portation methods.
226. See supra notes 24-31 for a discussion of the defendants’ past and current
efforts as well as their shortcomings.
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tation of commercial navigation in the CAWS.227  The court’s initial
determination that the establishment of an Asian carp population
in the Great Lakes would qualify as a public nuisance and cause
irreparable harm is founded on the logic set forth in the Restate-
ment’s analysis.228  The Seventh Circuit’s subsequent finding that
“the States’ complaint does not plausibly allege that the Corps and
the District are creating a current or imminent public nuisance by
the manner of their operating the CAWS” reveals an abrupt and
inconsistent leap in its reasoning.229  Additionally, the court’s ensu-
ing deference to the defendant agencies currently addressing the
carp problem and holding that the States “failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted” effectively allowed the Seventh
Circuit to sidestep the necessary analytical conclusion.230
The Seventh Circuit attempted to justify its inconclusive hold-
ing by asserting that a permanent injunction calling for hydrologi-
cal separation would be an injudicious use of equitable authority.231
The court reasoned that ordering such equitable relief would force
the defendant entities to lobby Congress for permission to con-
struct the barriers necessary to effectuate hydrological separa-
tion.232  Under the Progress Act, however, Congress already gave
the defendant entities permission to begin developing necessary
barriers if hydrological separation is deemed the appropriate pre-
ventative plan.233  The court, therefore, would not have exceeded
its authority by making a conclusive determination on the hydrolog-
ical separation’s appropriateness.234
Furthermore, the Report compiled by the Corps proposed pre-
ventative plans that were speculative and seemed either futile or
precariously similar to insufficient methods currently in use.235
227. See supra notes 164-72 for a discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning
in Asian Carp II.
228. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text for the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion regarding the likelihood of irreparable harm.
229. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905-07 (explaining court’s holding).
230. See id. at 906-07 (exploring court’s deference to defendant agencies and
final holding).
231. See id. at 907 (detailing Seventh Circuit’s belief that ordering injunction
would be injudicious use of equitable power).
232. See id. (explaining court’s underlying reasoning for injudicious power
belief).
233. For clarification that the Progress Act permits the defendants’ construc-
tion of barriers for hydrological separation, see supra notes 33-34 and accompany-
ing text.
234. For a comparison of the Progress Act’s intent and the court’s reasoning
see, supra notes 33-34, 168-72 and accompanying text.
235. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 898 (discussing proposed plans).
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The only effective plan presented in the Report was hydrological
separation, but the Corps emphasized its negative implications.236
Notably, the Report failed to select a recommended plan and, ac-
cordingly, requested that a “decision maker” select the proper pre-
ventative method.237
Based on the rationale exemplified in case law involving fed-
eral environmental public nuisance claims, the circumstances sur-
rounding Asian Carp II demanded definitive judicial instruction
from the Seventh Circuit.238  For example, in Missouri I, the Su-
preme Court recognized that it is sometimes necessary to subject a
defendant’s conduct, which strives to achieve a legitimately produc-
tive end, to “judicial supervision” when environmental interests and
corollary public rights are at stake.239  The Supreme Court’s hold-
ing that the plaintiff State was entitled to a permanent injunction if
the defendant company failed to show its ability to effectively rem-
edy the interstate public nuisance it was facilitating within a limited
timeframe in Tennessee Copper Co. provides enlightening insight on
the concept of judicial supervision.240  Moreover, the Seventh Cir-
cuit stopped short of motivationally instructing the defendant agen-
cies, essentially granting them unrestrained control over a problem
they show no promise of abating.241  This lack of judicial instruction
is especially concerning because the Corps specifically requested
guidance from a third-party decision-maker in determining the
proper preventative plan.242
Although this decision is complex and problematic, the Sev-
enth Circuit, in its capacity as a decision maker, must provide judi-
cial instruction and rule in favor of either protecting the Great
Lakes or preserving commercial navigation in the CAWS at the po-
236. See id. (discussing reported implications of hydrological separation).
237. See Summary of the GLMRIS Report, supra note 31, at 1 and accompanying
text for the Corps’ request for a decision maker to select the proper plan.
238. For a discussion of judicial supervision in environmental public nuisance
cases, see supra notes 67-75, 90 and accompanying text.
239. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 241-42 (discussing concept of judicial supervi-
sion in courts of equity).
240. See Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S at 238-39 (noting U.S. Supreme Court’s
grant of permanent injunction request and exemplifying judicial instruction that
effectively motivated responsible defendants to remedy public nuisance).
241. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 907  (stating Seventh Circuit’s final hold-
ing).
242. See Summary of the GLMRIS Report, supra note 31, at 1 and accompanying
text for the Corps’ comments on the need for a decision maker to select the appro-
priate plan.
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tential expense of the water system.243  The court’s deference to
defendant agencies with an inevitable unwillingness to make dras-
tic, but possibly vital, changes to their operation effectively left the
case at a standstill.244
VI. IMPACT: A BRACKISH PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
In an era where human might is paramount and manipulation
of the natural world for commercial benefit is commonplace, envi-
ronmental concerns inevitably arise from Mother Nature’s back-
lash.245 Asian Carp II is an exhibition of humanity’s obstinate will in
an attempt to strong-arm nature in the face of unyielding environ-
mental retaliation.246  The Corps and District’s unwillingness to
make costly sacrifices in the short-term stands to wreak havoc on an
invaluable water system, inflicting damage that is immune to
human remedies and monetarily immeasurable.247  Further, the
Seventh Circuit’s shortsighted holding will have long-term effects
on cases addressing pressing environmental problems, namely pub-
lic nuisance claims.248
Asian Carp II established precedent that, if applied in the fu-
ture, will impede the remedial process of manmade environmental
problems.249  After repeatedly acknowledging the likelihood of ir-
reparable harm to the Great Lakes’ ecosystem by a rapacious
aquatic nuisance species, the Seventh Circuit failed to make a defin-
itive decision to protect the ecosystem or not.250  The court’s final
ruling, in favor of the federal agencies facilitating the Asian carp
invasion, effectively placed the fate of the Great Lakes in the hands
243. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905-06 (claiming inappropriate nature of
court’s control over matter and subsequently holding that defendants effectively
have free control to operate CAWS).
244. See id. (showing deference to defendant agencies).
245. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 894 (expressing public nuisance stemming
from human manipulation of environment).  “Meddling with Mother Nature is
not always a good idea, as the ongoing saga of the Asian carp illustrates.” Id.
246. See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of factual
and background information surrounding Asian Carp II.
247. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 894 (asserting future harm from carp
invasion).
248. See supra notes 156-57, 171-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the court’s reasoning and final holding.
249. See supra notes 173-80, 241-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the implications stemming from the court’s final holding.
250. See supra notes 173-80, 241-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of
inconsistencies in the court’s reasoning.
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of those least likely to expeditiously seek satisfactory abatement of
the environmental problem.251
Asian Carp II’s final holding allows the defendant agencies to
continue their operation of the CAWS without any fear of punitive
consequences.252  In the public nuisance realm, an equitable rem-
edy, such as an injunction, is immanently preemptive; it prevents
unlawful damage before it occurs.253  Equitable remedies are cru-
cial in situations where the threatened harm will be irreparable if it
reaches fruition.254  Conversely, legal remedies are merely retroac-
tive and can only provide relief after the infliction of unlawful harm
transpires.255  If Asian carp invade the Great Lakes, it will be futile
for the plaintiff States to seek a legal remedy from the defendant
agencies due to the impossibility of redressing the harm
monetarily.256
Prevention of an aquatic nuisance invasion is vital because ret-
roactive eradication is impossible.257  Accordingly, hydrological sep-
aration must be implemented immediately unless responsible,
governmental agencies “redouble their efforts—both in terms of re-
sources and in terms of vision.”258  Moreover, without hastened at-
tempts to discover alternative preemptive plans, “viable solutions
. . . are probably decades away.”259  Indeed, members of the citi-
zenry “shoulder the costs and consequences of invasive species, not
251. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court’s deference to defendant agencies.
252. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905  (stating Seventh Circuit’s final
holding).
253. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 244-45 (explaining preventative quality of equi-
table remedies).
254. Id. (discussing purpose of equitable remedies).
255. Id. at 245 (explaining retroactive quality of legal remedies).
256. The Asian Carp Threat to the Great Lakes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Water Res. and Env’t of the H. Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 111th Cong. 6
(Feb. 9, 2010) (Dr. Michael J. Hansen, Chair, Great Lakes Fishery Commission),
available at  http://www.glfc.org/fishmgmt/Hansen_testimony_aisancarp.pdf (ex-
emplifying impossibility of retroactively remedying aquatic nuisance invasion).  Dr.
Michael Hansen is a firsthand witness to destructive invasions by species that are
less rapacious than Asian carp. Id.  He declared, “Eradication is impossible and
the ongoing program is expensive.” Id.
257. Id. (averring impossibility of retroactive eradication).
258. Id. (discussing lack of government efforts and inexistence of sufficient
alternative means to protect Great Lakes from invasion).  “The Great Lakes Fishery
Commission urges Congress to clearly express that end objective is ecological sepa-
ration – not ‘reduce the risk’ or ‘try to achieve separation while maintaining the
status quo.’” Id.
259. Id. (emphasizing temporal distance of sufficient measures under current
circumstances).
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the beneficiaries of open waterways for shipping.”260  In sum, if the
carp invasion reaches its culmination, members of the public, now
deprived of their right to enjoy and benefit from the Great Lakes,
will inevitably bear a double-burden.261  Victimized citizens will per-
petually pay for damages inflicted by means out of their control,
and responsible, defendant agencies will escape penalty, scot-
free.262
The Seventh Circuit’s holding is particularly unfortunate for
public nuisance cases involving invasive species threatening to
erode sound ecosystems because, in such situations, time is of the
essence.263  The court’s failure to make a definitive ruling essen-
tially tossed the possible implementation of an effective prevent-
ative measure to the wayside.264  Hydrological separation may or
may not have been appropriate, but the court’s holding under-
mined its effectiveness by circumventing the final analytical deter-
mination.265  In the future, time-sensitive environmental concerns
will be unnecessarily hindered if courts rely on Asian Carp II be-
cause unwieldy remedies will be cast aside.266  Contemporaneously,
seemingly manageable practices in favor of human reluctance to
relinquish control over the natural world will be adopted.267  The
consequent effects of Asian Carp II are to be seen, but logic and
history suggest that the ostensibly onerous implementation of hy-
drological separation will appear surprisingly feasible if newfound
260. Id. (stressing burden placed on citizenry rather than entities responsible
for harm).  “Programs to manage invasive species are costly and borne by taxpay-
ers.” Id. at 7.  Even if control of an invasive species as destructive as Asian carp
were possible, the process would be expensive and ongoing. Id.  Moreover, at-
tempting to control Asian carp would not only cost taxpayers hundreds of millions
of dollars, but also cause the loss of billions in dollars in revenue to parties that did
not contribute to the facilitation of the carp invasion. Id.  “[T]his figure does not
include the immeasurable damage to the ecology of the Great Lakes basin.” Id.
261. See The Asian Carp Threat to the Great Lakes, supra note 256 (discussing
unjust burdens placed on public citizenry).
262. Id. (explaining unjust placement of retroactive monetary burdens).
263. See id. at 2 (discussing time-sensitive nature of aquatic species’ issues).
“Invasive species are not a local or even a regional problem – they are a national
and global problem. Invasive species spread readily from region to region, so spe-
cies introduced into one part of the country will, in all likelihood, make it to other
parts of the country.” Id.
264. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905, 907 (explaining court’s holding that
cast aside hydrological separation option).
265. See supra notes 227-30, 238-44 and accompanying text for further discus-
sion of the court’s circumvention of the critical analytical step.
266. See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 244-45 (contrasting equitable remedies and
legal remedies).  For further discussion of problems arising under the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s approach, see supra notes 239-44, 252-56 and accompanying text.
267. See Asian Carp II, 758 F.3d at 905-07 (detailing hydrological separation’s
alleged unwieldy qualities).
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steps are not hastily implemented to prevent the Asian carp from
crossing into the Great Lakes’ threshold.268
Joseph J. Clemente*
268. See supra notes 5-12, 24-31, 257-62 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of carp’s destructive nature and the ineffectiveness of current prevention
methods.
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